By Elizabeth Annis*
Abstract
The Pacific Islands are engulfed in an existential
crisis. Rising sea levels and other climate change effects threaten their very
existence. Perhaps of more immediate concern, these islands have small,
vulnerable economies, which place many residents in a tenuous position as they
work to achieve a comfortable standard of living for themselves and their
families. Against this backdrop of climate and economic challenges, fourteen
Pacific Island countries are negotiating a free trade agreement with Australia
and New Zealand known as the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations, or
PACER Plus. Climate change and international trade law regimes are
intrinsically linked, and at times their objectives conflict. Nevertheless,
climate-friendly trade agreements are proliferating. Such agreements provide a
useful template for PACER Plus negotiators to ensure the agreement is
well-positioned to promote economic development in the PICs without
exacerbating climate change threats.
I. INTRODUCTION
II. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES
A. The Impact of Climate Change on the PICs
B. PIC Leaders Call Upon the International Community to Act
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE: MUST THE TWO CONFLICT?
IV. THE PACER PLUS AGREEMENT: CLIMATE-FRIENDLY?
A. Negotiations and the Draft Text
B. Critics Argue PACER Plus is Not Climate-Friendly
V. CLIMATE-FRIENDLY TRADE AGREEMENTS: THE POSSIBILITIES
A. Establish Separate Chapter or Side Agreement Devoted to Environment
B. Include Explicit Language in the Agreement to Support Climate Change Response Efforts
C. Establish Review Process that Proceeds Treaty Adoption
D. Establish Mechanism to Monitor Agreement’s Implementation
VI. PACER PLUS: THE PATH FORWARD
A. Create Inclusive Negotiating Process
B. Include a Climate Change Side Agreement
C. Adjust Existing Treaty Language to Ensure Inclusion of Climate-Friendly Language
D. Establish a Climate Change Review Body
VII.CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
Small
island developing states in the Pacific are entering a state of panic. These
Pacific Island Countries (PICs) are struggling to achieve a comfortable
standard of living through economic growth. At the same time, these islands are
experiencing some of the worst impacts of climate change as rising sea levels
threaten their very existence. Amidst these challenges, Australia, one of the
world’s largest emitters of carbon dioxide per capita, and New Zealand joined
with fourteen PICs to launch negotiations for the revised version of the Pacific
Agreement on Closer Economic Relations, PACER Plus. As with other multilateral
trade agreements intent on promoting economic development, critics question
whether this agreement will only exacerbate climate change threats in the PICs.
The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) explains the rationale supporting
this critique by saying, “very familiar are the ways that economic
activity—industry, food production, transport—and social
developments—population growth, increased urbanization and rising standards of
living—contribute to climate change.”[1]
Nevertheless, numerous international trade agreements recognize the tension
between promoting trade and sustaining the environment by offering solutions to
ensure the agreement does not hinder climate change mitigation and adaptation
efforts. Beyond ensuring the agreement does no harm, some trade arrangements go
one step further and are enlisted as a tool to proactively address climate
change. This Note asks if PACER Plus can be employed to combat climate change
in the PICs. I argue that, while trade and climate change objectives may at
times conflict, PACER Plus is uniquely positioned as an economic development
tool that can not only avoid exacerbating climate change but can also mitigate
its effects.
In
Part II, I provide background on the PICs’ experience with climate change. In Part
III, I explore the relationship between trade and climate change and question
whether the two must inherently conflict. In Part IV, I review the draft PACER
Plus Agreement and the extent to which seems to reinforce or conflict with the
climate agenda. In Part V, I review recently concluded regional trade
agreements to consider the climate-friendly possibilities for PACER Plus.
Finally, in Part VI, I suggest a path forward for PACER Plus as the agreement
enters the final stages of negotiations.
I.
Climate Change and the Pacific Island Countries
Climate
change has wreaked havoc on PICs. UNEP named climate change and rising sea
levels as “undoubtedly the most pressing threat to the environment and
sustainable development of SIDs [small island developing states].”[2]
Small island developing states emit less than one percent of all global
greenhouse gas emissions but are disproportionately impacted by climate change’s
effects.[3]
Among the SIDs, PICs are especially vulnerable due to their small size,
population density, weak infrastructures, and the concentration of economic
activities in coastal areas.[4]
Some impact is already apparent and theses effects will likely get worse as
greenhouse gas emissions will inevitably continue into the foreseeable future.
UNEP warns comprehensive climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies
are “urgently needed” to support all SIDs.[5]
A. The
Impact of Climate Change on the PICs
Climate
change’s effects on the PICs are numerous and varied. Kumi Naidoo, Executive
Director of Greenpeace International, expressed alarm “We’re already seeing
Pacific communities lose their land and their homes resulting from extreme
weather events and the impacts of climate change. This is a growing
humanitarian crisis that will only undermine regional stability and security if
it is not adequately dealt with.”[6]
In particular, some of the risks include rising sea levels, the intensification
of extreme, unpredictable weather events, and population displacement.[7]
Rising
sea levels are a “major existential challenge”[8]
for the PICs. In some areas of the Pacific, sea levels are rising by 1.2 cm per
year.[9]
This rate is four times faster than the global average.[10]
A projection for Kiribati, one of the PICs, estimates that by 2030, sea levels
could rise between five and fourteen centimeters.[11]
The Marshall Islands, at just six feet above sea level,[12]
and Tuvalu, at fifteen feet above, are especially threatened.[13]
Former Prime Minister of Tuvalu, Saufatu Sapo’aga, told the United Nations that
climate change is equivalent to “a slow and insidious form of terrorism against
us.”[14]
In
addition to rising sea levels, extreme, unpredictable weather events are
frequent and intensifying. The U.N. Office for Disaster Risk Reduction reported
in 2013 that more than 110 disasters affected the Pacific region between 2000
and 2011.[15]
More recently, Cyclone Pam ravaged the South Pacific on March 13, 2015, and was
called “one of the most powerful [cyclones] ever recorded in the south
Pacific.”[16]
The storm, at its peak, recorded winds up to 165 mph, and reached Port Vila,
Vanuatu’s capital.[17]
The Australian Red Cross reported that in Port Vila, “humanitarian needs will
be enormous. Many people have lost their homes. Shelter, food and water [are]
urgent priorities.”[18]
Cyclone Pam left twenty-four fatalities in its wake,[19]
resulting in heavy flooding in Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands.[20]
In a press briefing at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21), The Tuvaluan Prime
Minister, Enele Sopoaga, captured the urgency of the moment for PICs, saying, “Cyclone
Pam . . . [was] a timely warning that we need to do something. Here in Paris,
we cannot lose this opportunity.”[21]
These disasters are likely to continue. The U.N.’s World Risk Index named
Vanuatu and Tonga as “global disaster risk hotspots where high exposure to
natural hazards and climate change coincides.”[22]
Christopher Bartlett, head of the Vanuatu Food Security and Agriculture
Cluster, explained the far-reaching impact of frequent natural disasters
saying, “The accumulation of natural hazards, wholly inconsistent with normal
climate patterns, is beginning to seriously jeopardise food security.”[23]
Partly
because of rising sea levels and intensifying weather events, some PIC
residents have already migrated, and many more may need to migrate in the near
future. Worldwide, by 2050, climate change may displace as many as 250 million
people.[24]
Indeed, UNEP named the world’s first climate refugees as those 2,600 people
relocated from low-lying areas in Papua New Guinea.[25]
Because of climate change’s acute affect on the PICs, the likely result is
significant population displacement and the need to devote resources and
develop coordinated strategies to respond to the existential threats posed.
The
PICs’ unique wealth of indigenous and local knowledge can allow them to develop
sustainable solutions to mitigate climate change’s effects that also resonate
well with local cultures.[26]
However, notwithstanding this knowledge, as developing countries, PICs have
limited financial and technical resources. As UNEP reports, “The challenges
related to extreme events are exacerbated by the lack of capacity and limited
financing to effectively implement management strategies”[27]
and “[the] lack of skills could severely hamper the ability of SIDS to manage
climate change impacts.”[28]
Therefore, resource-constrained PICs must rely on outside support to
effectively confront climate change threats. However, outside support has
proven insufficient.
B. PIC
Leaders Call Upon the International Community to Act
PIC
leaders are not satisfied with current international efforts to address climate
change. The Federated States of Micronesia’s President, Peter Christian, told
the U.N. in 2015, “We must become more cohesive in our actions to bring a
useful conclusion to help mitigate the threat of sinking islands and prevent
the potential genocide of Oceanic peoples and cultures.”[29]
Prime Minister Sopoaga, stated, “We’re simply seeking for the rights of small
island states to survive. We feel our security is compromised; survival of the
people of the Pacific is compromised.”[30]
President Anote Tong of Kiribati added, “What we are talking about is survival,
it’s not about economic development…it’s not politics, it’s survival.”[31]
At COP21, three PIC leaders held a press conference entitled “COP21: Fate of
the Pacific Islands.” The briefing included statements from Tuvalu’s Prime
Minister Enele Sopoaga, Palau’s Prime Minister H.E. Tommy Remengesau, Jr., and
the Cook Islands’ Prime Minister, Henry Puna. All expressed concern with the
negotiations. Prime Minister Sopoaga stated, “We need to do our task as
leaders. We cannot shy away and be intimidated.”[32]
Prime Minister Remengesau added, “Because we are going to fall short on what
needs to be done, it is incumbent upon us to do whatever we can on our own.”[33]
PIC
frustrations are particularly high with Australia, a fellow PACER Plus
negotiating party. Australia, a signatory to the Paris Agreement,[34]
ranks as one of the world’s highest carbon dioxide emitters per capita.[35]
Former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott pledged to reduce carbon emissions
measured in 2005 by twenty-six to twenty-eight percent by 2030, a commitment
many environmental groups deem “pathetically inadequate.”[36]
Mr. Abbott defended his government’s position by saying, “We can be constructive global citizens when it comes to
climate change without clobbering our economy.”[37] Anote Tong,
President of Kiribati, called Australia “very selfish” for maintaining its
current coal mining practices.[38]
President Tong is not alone amongst PIC leaders in his disappointment. The
Chief Executive of Greenpeace Australia, David Ritter, explained, “People in
the Pacific are very polite but privately the view of Australia is very clear:
this is a country not doing enough. There’s a view that Australia is putting
coal ahead of people.”[39]
II.
The Relationship Between Climate Change and
Trade: Must the Two Conflict?
Against
the backdrop of severe climate change threats, the PICs are negotiating PACER
Plus, a regional trade agreement. The relationship between climate change and
international trade is complex. The notion that international trade will
exacerbate climate change is a commonly held belief.[40]
For example, if economic development through
liberalized trade is pursued at all costs, the resulting increased production
and transport of goods by trucks, rail, and sea will raise carbon emissions,
thus potentially conflicting with climate change objectives.[41] At any
rate, as Henry Derwent, Senior Advisor for Climate Strategies for the E15
Initiative notes, “GHG-heavy
fossil fuel-based energy and goods production is, and will for some time
continue to be, the most economic choice.”[42]
Further, a trade agreement could constrain a government’s ability to enact
climate change legislation.[43]
If the enacted legislation—for example, subsidies on low-carbon technology—is viewed
as unnecessarily trade restrictive, the policy may face legal challenges either
at the WTO or within the framework of a regional trade agreement.[44]
Thus, there are many ways in which pursuing economic development through
liberalized trade can hinder climate change response efforts.
Conversely,
climate change strategies can hinder a developing country’s participation in
international trade, and consequently, its economic development. Well-intentioned
climate change policies, and those that only serve as a disguised restriction
on international trade, can disproportionately burden developing countries.
Robert Read, Senior Lecturer in International Business at Lancaster University,
contends, “Complying with minimum national or
international environmental standards is increasingly important for developing
countries in order to secure market access for their exports . . . [C]ompliance
by SILDEs [small island and littoral developing economies] may require costly
modifications to domestic process and production methods (PPMs) or
technological upgrading.”[45] For example, climate regulation in country A
may involve a certain labeling scheme for all products X to enable consumers to
choose based on the products’ carbon footprint.[46] If country B hopes to
export product X, it will have to adhere to the technical regulation.
Implementing such a labeling requirement necessitates an infrastructure and
resources to ensure compliance, which may not be technically or financially
feasible for an emerging company in a developing country. If environmental
regulations are unnecessarily onerous, developing countries that lack the capacity
to comply will face continued exclusion from international markets. This
exclusion represents a lost opportunity for countries like the PICs to raise
their standard of living.
Despite
these many potential conflicts, PACER Plus will not inevitably hinder climate
change response efforts simply because it is a trade agreement. The
relationship between trade and climate change can be symbiotic, as both share
the same objective: sustainable development. Dr. Rafael Leal-Arcas, Trade and
Climate Change Expert for the E15 Initiative, explains, “Both
trade and climate have irrefutable links to sustainable development, making it
a logical step to explore the potential for mutual cooperation and factor this
into response measures.”[47] As shown, if the
PICs exclusively pursue economic or climate considerations, negative
consequences will likely result. Therefore, to ensure the
shared sustainable development objective is realized, policymakers must pay
sufficient attention to potential conflict areas. This
surely requires balancing and prioritizing policy goals. PACER Plus, which is
touted as a “development-friendly” agreement, provides a unique opportunity for
PIC leaders to discover the appropriate balance between climate change and
economic development.[48]
III. The
PACER Plus Agreement: Climate-Friendly?
The
PACER Plus Agreement has not yet concluded at the time of this writing.[49]
Therefore, it is unclear whether the agreement is climate-friendly because the
text is neither final nor public. Even so, available public statements and
defined negotiation issues suggest climate change is not a major focus of the
agreement.
A. Negotiations
Lack Focus on the Importance of Climate-Friendly Language
As
negotiations currently stand, PACER Plus will not explicitly address climate
change, rather it will consider it only indirectly. Dr. Edwini Kessie, head
negotiator for the PICs, elaborated, “We have not
focused exclusively on climate change in the negotiations. However, there
is a view that through the opportunities that would be provided by PACER Plus,
countries will be in a position to adequately respond to the challenges posed
by climate change.”[50] If PIC economies grow as
a result of PACER Plus, presumably PIC governments will consequently have more financial
resources available to adequately respond to climate change effects.
Despite
climate change’s status as “the most pressing threat” to PICs, [51]
of the nine negotiating issues identified, only “development assistance” has a
direct relation to climate change. Therefore, one might expect climate change
assistance to be central in any discussion of development in the PICs.
Nevertheless, the description from the Office of the Chief Trade Adviser (OCTA)
for the PICs suggests, in the context of PACER Plus, development assistance refers
only to the provision of resources to help the PICs fully implement their
obligations under PACER Plus, and realize the economic benefits of the
agreement.[52]
It is not intended to commit Australia and New Zealand to providing financial
assistance for climate change response efforts.[53]
B. Critics
Argue PACER Plus is Not Climate-Friendly
While
PACER Plus proponents contend the economic gains from the agreement will place
the PICs in a better position to address climate change threats, critics are
dubious. Considering trade agreements operate to lower import tariffs, the net
effect may conceivably reduce government revenue. In this case, PACER Plus
governments would have less money available to spend on adequate climate change
mitigation and adaptation strategies. Geoffrey J. Bannister and Kamau Thugge,
senior economists at the International Monetary Fund, explain, “There is a
general concern trade reform may lead to lower government revenues as trade
taxes are reduced and that, in an effort to maintain macroeconomic stability,
governments may cut social expenditures . . . .”[54]
PACER Plus will undoubtedly lower import tariffs PICs collect on goods from
Australia and New Zealand. While data for most PICs is unavailable, the
World Bank estimates that from 2001-2005, customs and other import duties
accounted for 9.7% of Samoa’s tax revenue. Presumably, other PICs are similarly
situated, suggesting a high reliance on import tariffs for government revenue.[55]
If the revenue lost from import tariffs foregone is not replaced from other
sources, perhaps these critics are correct.
Second,
critics argue the agreement will constrain the PICs’ ability to regulate
environmental policy. Trade agreements generally forbid governments from
enacting policies, including environmental policies, that unnecessarily restrict
trade. Maureen Penjeuli from the Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG), a
Pacific regional network concerned with promoting economic justice in globalization,
argues, “From what we can see from the legal texts, most of the benefits will
accrue to Australia and New Zealand and in fact we will tie up most [PICs]
government’s ability to regulate, or to regulate in the interests of
environment, culture, but also economics.”[56]
Additionally, critics reference
civil society groups’ exclusion from negotiations to suggest PACER Plus is not
environmentally friendly. In May of 2015, about forty civil society
organizations, including environmental groups, wrote letters to express
concerns over the PACER Plus agreement.[57]
Noelene Nabulivou, political advisor from Diverse Voices and Action for
Equality, argued, “[I]f there really was nothing for us to worry about, then we
would be in the consulting room, we would be [] working through the negotiating
text.”[58]
OCTA
addresses many of these concerns on its website, calling them “myths.”[59]
For example, OCTA argues PIC governments will not lose their ability to
regulate, saying, “Trade agreements do not compel countries to give up their
regulatory powers. Parties are able to amend existing regulations or introduce
new regulations.”[60]
Further, civil society groups are not entirely excluded from dialogues
regarding PACER Plus. These groups are encouraged to attend the “Non-State
Actors Workshop on the PACER Plus Negotiations” hosted by OCTA. The workshops
provide an overview of the main negotiating issues, the potential costs and
benefits of PACER Plus, and an opportunity for these actors to influence the PICs’
chief negotiators.[61] OCTA contends:
“Progress is being made in the PACER Plus negotiations and it
is vitally important for the Pacific Island Countries to maintain dialogue with
all Non-State Actors to keep them abreast of developments in the negotiations
and get their inputs in order to come up with an agreement that will be
meaningful and provide the private sector with opportunities to invest and
engage in cross-border trade effortlessly.”[62]
These
non-state actor workshops demonstrate that, through OCTA, civil society groups
do appear to have at least some voice in the PACER Plus negotiations.
In sum, it is unclear today whether
PACER Plus will exacerbate or enhance the PICs’ ability to effectively respond
to climate change impacts. Convincing arguments exist on both sides of the
debate. Nevertheless, given the severity of the climate change threats facing
the PICs and the potential for conflict between trade and climate change,
negotiators must make climate change a central concern in negotiations to
ensure the final PACER Plus text is not a stumbling block for response efforts.
If framed correctly, the PACER Plus agreement will not hinder the climate
change response and may even serve as a tool to proactively address the issue.
Negotiators must ensure the PACER Plus agreement is truly “climate-friendly.”
IV. Climate-Friendly
Trade Agreements: The Possibilities
Many
existing regional trade agreements (RTAs) include innovative climate-friendly
provisions, which could serve as useful guidance for PACER Plus negotiators.
Dr. Leal-Arcas explains the potential to use RTAs to encourage cooperation on
climate change and trade, saying:
“Involving major GHG
[greenhouse gas] emitters through RTAs and economic partnership agreements that
include contingent climate mitigation efforts can be an effective avenue toward
reducing GHG emissions and could therefore move both the trade and climate
agendas forward harmoniously . . . Regional trade agreements, with their rapid
proliferation across the globe, present a logical forum for incorporating
climate mitigation provisions.”[63]
He adds, “RTAs promoting climate
mitigation goals can have strong benefits for economic growth in developing
countries, delivering both environmental and trade wins.”[64] Climate-friendly RTAs take many
forms, including establishing a complementary side agreement devoted to
environmental protection, including explicit climate-friendly language in the trade
agreement itself, establishing an environmental impact review process prior to
treaty adoption, or even establishing a mechanism to monitor the agreement’s climate
change impact throughout implementation. Each of these concepts was explored
in-depth by a group of scholars for the International Centre for Trade and
Sustainable Development (ICTSD scholars) in a comprehensive report entitled, “Climate Change and
Sustainable Energy Measures in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs).”[65]
A. Establish
Separate Side Agreement Devoted to Environment
Some
climate-friendly RTAs include a separate side agreement, negotiated in the same
time frame as the trade agreement, specifically dedicated to addressing environmental
concerns and promoting cooperation. For example, the Canada-Peru Free Trade
Agreement, signed in 2008,[66]
is complemented by a separate side agreement signed that same year, and devoted
entirely to promoting cooperation on environment issues. This side agreement,
entitled the “Canada-Peru Agreement on Environment Cooperation,” includes a
provision that explicitly encourages trade and investment in environmental
goods and services.[67]
Eliminating tariff and non-tariff trade barriers on climate-friendly goods
could start a virtuous cycle: as the barriers fall, prices will decrease, thus
causing demand to rise, which will in turn spur greater production and even
lower prices.[68]
A provision in Article 2 states,
“Neither party shall encourage
trade or investment by weakening or reducing the levels of protection afforded
in its environmental laws. Accordingly, neither Party shall waive or otherwise
derogate from environmental laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the
protections afforded in those laws in order to encourage trade or investment.”[69]
Thus,
the side agreement pre-emptively acknowledges the potential conflict between
trade and the environment, affirming both parties’ desire to maintain
regulatory freedom to protect the environment and respect one another’s
efforts.
Additionally,
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides another useful
example. NAFTA established an environmental side agreement called the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), with a stated
objective of promoting sustainable development “based on cooperation and
mutually supportive environmental and economic policies.”[70]
This provision clearly acknowledges the need to design symbiotic trade and
environmental policies where possible. The NAAEC was recently used as a model
for an agreement between Australia and Japan.[71]
By negotiating a separate side agreement
devoted to the environment, the parties to a trade agreement clearly signify a
shared desire to interpret the trade provisions in a manner that is cognizant
of other important societal concerns, like climate change; neither environment
nor trade objectives are meant to supplant the other.
An
environmental side agreement is also worth considering because it can house important
capacity-building provisions. ICTSD scholars claim these provisions are useful
for “establish[ing]
institutional arrangements to train officials, advise on policy reform, assist
in monitoring and enforcement of environmental provisions and usually include a
funding mechanism to ensure financial support for such initiatives.”[72] These provisions
can ensure parties to an agreement have the technical and financial capacity
required to ensure the environmental protections envisioned by the side
agreement are realized. The utility of
climate-friendly provisions is diminished if the relevant agencies are not
adequately trained to implement the provisions as intended.
B. Include
Explicit Climate-Friendly Language in the Agreement’s Text
Aside
from simultaneously negotiating a side agreement focused on the environment, or
specifically on climate change, PACER Plus may promote the climate change
agenda by including explicit, climate-friendly language in the text of the
trade agreement itself. The language may appear in the agreement’s preamble,
embedded in the trade and investment chapters as exceptions to certain
obligations, or in an entirely separate chapter.
The preambles in many RTAs now include a reference to
environment preservation, sustainable development, or even climate change. This
serves as a “general statement[] of intent,” ensuring all parties are aware the
agreement is not intended to contravene these other values.[73]
In U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, the preamble states the parties agree
to act, “in a manner consistent with their commitment to high labour standards,
sustainable development, and environmental protection.”[74]
The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement also uses the preamble to acknowledge
the need to balance economic and environmental objectives to achieve
sustainable development noting, “economic
development, social development, and environmental protection are
interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of sustainable development,
and that an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system can play a
major role in achieving sustainable development.”[75] The Treaty of Asunción, which
established a common market between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
known as the South-American Comm Market (MERCOSUR), recognizes in its preamble
that the economic objectives of the agreement “must be achieved through more
effective use of available resources, preserving the environment . . . .”[76] Finally, the preamble to
the Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement also
acknowledges the need to balance trade and environment concerns saying, “[we] recognize
the mutual supportiveness between trade and environment policies and the need
to implement [the]
Agreement in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation
and the sustainable use of their resources.”[77] These non-exhaustive examples
demonstrate a popular desire to use the preamble of trade agreements to ensure
all parties acknowledge the text is not intended to preempt environmental
considerations.
Climate-friendly RTAs also ensure various trade and investment
provisions do not supersede environmental concerns by establishing explicit
exceptions that permit a country to forgo certain trade and investment
commitments when maintaining them contravenes environmental regulations. Exceptions
help ensure trade agreements do not require countries to forfeit their ability
to regulate to benefit the environment, a concern voiced by some critics of
PACER Plus.[78]
They give countries the flexibility to address challenges like climate change.
These exceptions are present in many RTAs. For example, the
trade agreement between the EU and South Korea explicitly states that any
measures taken to facilitate trade “shall not prejudice the fulfillment of
legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of national security,
health and the environment.”[79] The EU-CARIFORUM (The
Caribbean Forum) Economic Partnership Agreement includes an exception intended
to preserve local and indigenous knowledge, which is likely useful for climate
change adaptation strategies in the PICs.[80] The exception states the
parties must, “respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and
practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.”[81] These agreements show a
variety of ways RTAs can ensure potential conflicts between climate and
economic objectives do not necessarily result in hindering climate change mitigation
and adaptation efforts.
Climate-friendly RTAs also may include a separate chapter devoted
to the environment or, specifically, to climate change. Many recent trade agreements
follow this trend. For example, the Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter
17, entitled “Environment,” signaling a commitment to account for environmental
concerns to implement [the] Agreement in a manner consistent with environmental
protection and conservation and the sustainable use of their resources.”[82]
Additionally, the EU-Colombia-Peru trade agreement
has a separate chapter devoted to “Trade and Sustainable Development,” which
includes Article 275 on climate change. This article reads, in part:
“The Parties agree to consider
actions to contribute to achieving climate change mitigation and adaptation
objectives through their trade and investment policies, inter alia by:
(a)
facilitating
the removal of trade and investment barriers to access to, innovation,
development, and deployment of goods, services and technologies that can
contribute to mitigation or adaptation, taking into account the circumstances
of developing countries;
(b)
promoting
measures for energy efficiency and renewable energy that respond to
environmental and economic needs and minimise technical obstacles to trade.”[83]
This
chapter also houses a provision that reaffirms the parties’ commitment to
upholding the standards agreed upon in major international environmental
treaties. Article 270 states:
“The Parties
recognise the value of international environmental governance and agreements as
a response of the international community to global or regional environmental
problems and stress the need to enhance the mutual supportiveness between trade
and environment. In this context, the Parties shall dialogue and cooperate as
appropriate with respect to trade-related environmental issues of mutual
interest.”[84]
Article 275 specifically acknowledges the importance of existing
commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and
the Kyoto Protocol.[85] The inclusion of explicit
language affirming the signatories’ commitment to international environmental
treaties, helps ensure the trade provisions are interpreted to require some
level of balancing between trade and climate concerns in the event the two
conflict.
C. Establish
Review Process That Precedes Treaty Adoption
Prior
to the treaty’s adoption, establishing a body charged with reviewing the treaty’s
possible environmental impacts can also help ensure a final agreement is
sufficiently climate-friendly. New Zealand, one major
PACER Plus party, already has such a review mechanism in place. Before New
Zealand is permitted to become a party to any treaty, a body must perform a
“National Interest Assessment” that considers many factors, including potential
environmental impact.[86] In addition to New
Zealand, the United States, by Executive Order 13141 and its statutory sibling
the Trade Act of 2002, established a review process
to evaluate environmental factors in the development of all trade agreements.[87] ICTSD scholars explain
these assessments are valuable because the results “may assist negotiators to
identify the areas where preventive, cooperative or enhancement initiatives
could be useful to promote climate-change objectives in a trade or investment
treaty.”[88] An effective review
process may therefore prevent the adoption of a treaty that does not adequately
protect the PICs’ interest in combatting climate change.
D. Establish
Mechanism to Monitor Agreement’s Implementation
A
climate-friendly RTA should be subject to regular environmental impact
assessments throughout the agreement’s implementation. ICTSD scholars note the
popularity of this approach saying, “many developed
and developing countries now undertake ex-ante or ongoing environmental,
developmental, human rights or sustainability impact assessments and reviews of
trade liberalisation policies and draft treaties.”[89] These periodic
assessments ensure an agreement remains climate-friendly by providing an avenue
through which the balance between climate and economic objectives is
continually evaluated and, if necessary, corrected. A side agreement of a
particular trade agreement may develop such a mechanism. For example, NAFTA’s
environmental side agreement created the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC). The CEC aims to “[promote] information
exchange on environmental issues, assess[] environmental impacts of proposed
projects and deal[] with complaints from private individuals concerning
non-implementation of environmental laws by NAFTA parties.”[90]
V.
PACER Plus: The Path Forward
At
the outset of PACER Plus negotiations, Sergio Marchi, Ambassador and Senior
Fellow at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development,
stressed the importance of negotiators consciously developing a “positive
environmental agenda.”[91]
Ambassador Marchi’s vision is certainly possible. The diverse strategies in
RTAs that ensure the desired economic development through enhanced trade does
not weaken a state’s ability to confront climate change threats are a template
PACER Plus negotiators can follow as they craft a final agreement. To safeguard
a climate-friendly outcome and enhance regional cooperation, PACER Plus
negotiators should review these and other existing climate-friendly RTAs and
use the strategies employed as guidance for the final PACER Plus agreement. Specifically,
PACER Plus negotiators should consider the utility of adopting a more inclusive
negotiating process, establishing a side agreement devoted to climate change,
adjusting existing trade and investment language to ensure policy space to
consider climate objectives, and creating a climate-change review body to
examine the agreement for climate effects prior to adoption and throughout
implementation.
A. Create
an Inclusive Negotiating Process
A
PACER Plus negotiating process that includes civil society groups concerned
about the Agreement’s impact on climate change will ensure, as ICTSD scholars
believe, “environmental or social concerns that may
have been overlooked” will be “considered and addressed in the trade treaty.”[92] Dejo Olowu,
Professor of Law at North-West University in South Africa, also extolls civil society’s importance, claiming, “Policy
makers must realise the need . . . for the civil society to have a say in
international dialogue on ways of tackling global environmental problems.”[93]
Including representatives from civil society groups in the negotiating process
can ensure a diversity of perspectives on the relative value of economic growth
and the environment are represented in the final agreement.
Unfortunately, civil society groups in the PICs, aside from
private sector representatives, are not welcome in PACER Plus negotiations.[94] Even so, as previously
discussed, these groups can still influence negotiators by attending the “Non-State Actors Workshop on the
PACER Plus Negotiations” hosted by OCTA and
expressing their views. Still, the forty letters from civil society groups in
May 2015 demanding negotiations cease demonstrate these groups continue to feel
excluded.[95]
To the extent civil society groups aim to express concerns regarding the Agreement’s
potential impact on the climate change agenda in the PICs, and the non-state
actor workshops provide an insufficient opportunity to be heard, this exclusion
might prevent negotiators from reaching an appropriate balance between climate
and economic objectives.
Despite objections, secrecy may be necessary and indeed does not
necessarily mean the views of civil society groups are not part of the
negotiations. Secrecy permits negotiators to make potentially politically
unpopular concessions in the interest of concluding a deal in which the
benefits accrued to the population as a whole outweigh the costs. And negotiators
may already be expressing the same views these civil society groups hope to
espouse, only the public is left unaware. Frank
Yourn, Executive Director of the Australia Pacific Islands Business Council, describes the
experience of fear stemming from this secrecy:
“The trouble with trade
negotiations is that there is always the fear of the unknown. In 1983
there were fears in New Zealand when they were negotiating a trade deal with
Australia but now I think it’s fair to assume that New Zealand would be very
glad they entered into those negotiations. I suspect there were fears in
Europe when the European Union was being formed and it is now one of the
strongest economic communities in the world.”[96]
If
involving civil society is impossible due to the need for secrecy, to help
overcome the fear that PACER Plus will not sufficiently address civil society’s
concerns, PACER Plus negotiators must ensure civil society groups have a
meaningful opportunity to voice their views such that all concerned parties
feel included in the process. The
negotiators might consider holding more frequent non-state actor workshops to
create additional opportunities for dialogue between negotiators and civil
society groups, and to correct misunderstandings about the agreement. An open
line of communication is perhaps the best method to create public support for
the agreement, thereby enhancing its overall legitimacy.
B. Include
a Climate Change Side Agreement
In
addition to making negotiations more inclusive, PACER Plus parties should take
advantage of the regional forum negotiations have established and encourage
dialogue about climate change threats in the Pacific by drafting a climate
change side agreement that addresses outstanding concerns. After all, the PACER
Plus parties are largely the same as those that will inevitably need to
coordinate climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts in the Pacific. This
agreement would accompany the final PACER Plus text. A climate change side agreement should
include, for example, defined financial and technical assistance commitments
from Australia and New Zealand to help the most vulnerable PICs take
preventative steps to mitigate impending climate change threats.
A
side agreement could also confront imminent climate change migration by
establishing a defined procedure for the dignified relocation of displaced PIC
residents in the event these island states disappear or become uninhabitable.
Authors of a recent handbook on international labor migration lend support for
this idea noting that, “[f]aced with the absence of a multilateral treaty and
of a global architecture, governments today are turning to bilateral agreements
as the preferred mode of migration governance to deal with the cross-border
movement of capital and persons.”[97]
The PICs have called for the creation of an international body to coordinate
the movement of climate change refugees.[98]
Perhaps a climate change side agreement is the proper forum for such a
creation. Notably, Australia opposed the idea during COP21 negotiations.[99]
Nevertheless, the smaller negotiating forum provided by PACER Plus may permit
Australia to address its concerns about an international migration governance
body ultimately allow it to shape the role of such a body rather than oppose
its creation altogether.
C.
Adjust Existing Treaty Language to Ensure
Inclusion of Climate-Friendly Language
Negotiators
should consider including climate-friendly text in the existing agreement.
PACER Plus’ preamble should acknowledge the parties’ commitment to confronting
climate change threats and confirm the agreement must not be construed to
inhibit mitigation and adaptation efforts nor supersede existing commitments to
international environmental treaties. Framing the agreement in this manner
demonstrates an overarching dedication to consider climate change impacts when
interpreting the agreement’s specific trade and investment provisions. PACER
Plus should also include explicit exceptions to the trade and investment
provisions that provide the PICs sufficient policy space to enact climate
regulations. For example, an exception might state that the facilitation of
trade shall not prevent a state from fulfilling legitimate policy objectives,
such as responding to climate change threats.
D. Establish
a Climate-Change Review Body
The
PICs should establish a body composed of climate experts to review the final
PACER Plus agreement prior to adoption and monitor the Agreement’s
implementation. To account for each PIC’s limited capacity, a single review
body could be charged with protecting the climate interests of all PICs.
Perhaps this body could be housed within Vanuatu’s newly formed Climate Change
ministry.[100]
The body should have an established procedure for accepting complaints from
individuals, civil society groups, or other concerned actors regarding the
climate impact of the agreement, and should react to such complaints with a
rigorous investigation. The review body should be empowered to propose
amendments to the agreement and to initiate amendment proceedings if necessary.
These adjustments to current negotiation procedures and the agreement text
combined with the creation of a review mechanism can ensure PACER Plus does not
exacerbate, but rather enhances, climate change mitigation and adaptation
efforts in the PICs.
VII.
Conclusion
Climate
change poses urgent and severe threats to the future prosperity of the Pacific
Island countries. Without coordinated and dedicated action to respond to these
threats, the already dire circumstances will only intensify. Simultaneously,
many individuals in the PICs live in poverty as a result of those countries’
under-developed and vulnerable economies. The PACER Plus agreement represents a
unique opportunity to unite the objectives of economic development and climate
change mitigation and adaptation efforts into one integrated, international
solution. Potential conflicts exist between promoting trade and addressing
climate change. Nevertheless, many regional trade and investment agreements
already employ innovative strategies to preemptively resolve these conflicts
and ensure an appropriate balance is reached. PACER Plus negotiators should
recognize that they too need not sacrifice one objective at the expense of they
other. Negotiators should use existing relevant agreements as guidance in the
remaining negotiations. If these strategies are successfully incorporated, the
PACER Plus Agreement can live up to its stated objective of embodying a truly
development-friendly agreement that benefits all parties involved.
* Elizabeth
Annis received her J.D. in 2016 from Georgetown University Law Center, where
she concentrated in WTO law. This Note was written during a semester studying
international trade and development at the Graduate Institute of International
and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. This note will be published in
a forthcoming issue of the Georgetown Journal of International Law.
[1] United Nations Env't Programme [UNEP], Emerging Issues for Small Island Developing
States: Results of the UNEP Foresight Process 54 (June 2014), http://www.unep.org/pdf/Emerging_issues_for_small_island_developing_states.pdf.
[hereinafter Emerging Issues].
[3] Id. at viii, 55.
[4] Id. at 41.
[5] Id. at viii.
[6] Sarah Lazare, Most Vulnerable Pacific Islands Demand
Global Moratorium on New Goal, CommonDreams
(Sept. 8, 2015), http://editors.commondreams.org/news/2015/09/08/most-vulnerable-pacific-islands-demand-global-moratorium-new-coal.
[8] Oliver Milman,
Pacific nations beg for help for
islanders when ‘calamity’ of climate change hits, The Guardian (Oct. 10, 2015, 5:45 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/oct/14/pacific-nations-beg-for-help-for-islanders-when-calamity-of-climate-change-hits.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Pacific Climate Change Science Program:
Current and Future Climate of Kiribati, Int’l
Climate Change Adaptation Initiative 7
(2011), http://www.pacificclimatechangescience.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/11_PCCSP_Kiribati_8pp.pdf.
[12] Coral
Davenport, The Marshall Islands are
Disappearing, N.Y. Times (Dec.
1 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/02/world/The-Marshall-Islands-Are-Disappearing.html?_r=0.
[13] Leslie Allen, Will Tuvalu Disappear Beneath the Sea?, Smithsonian Mag. (Aug. 2004), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/will-tuvalu-disappear-beneath-the-sea-180940704/?no-ist.
[14] Id.
[16] Angela Bolis, Vanuatu reconstruction moves ahead in the
aftermath of cyclone Pam, The
Guardian (July 28, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/vanuatu-cyclone-pam-el-nino-reconstruction.
[17] Jon Erdman, Cyclone Pam: Vanuatu Direct Hit (RECAP),
The Weather Channel (Mar. 15, 2015,
4:45 PM), https://weather.com/storms/typhoon/news/cyclone-pam-vanuatu-south-pacific.
[18] Sean Morris,
Steve Almasy, & Laura Smith-Park, ‘Unbelievable
destruction’ reported in Tropical Cyclone Pam’s wake, CNN (Mar. 14, 2015, 11:22 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/13/asia/cyclone-pam-vanuatu/.
[19] Cyclone Pam: UN
confirms 24 dead and 3,300 displaced in Vanuatu, BBC News (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31912305.
[20] Australia’s inaction on climate change set
to dominate Pacific Island talks, The
Guardian (Sept. 5, 2015, 8:34 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/06/australias-inaction-on-climate-change-set-to-dominate-pacific-island-talks.
[21] Cook Islands – COP21: Fate of the Pacific Islands,
2015 UN Climate Change Conf. (Dec.
5, 2015), available at http://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop21/events/2015-12-05-11-00-cook-islands.
[23] Bolis, supra note 16.
[24] Milman, supra note 8.
[26] Id. at vi.
[27] Id. at 43.
[28] Id. at 8.
[29] Island States threatened by rising seas call
at UN for urgent action on climate change, U.N.
News Ctr. (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52118#.V1L8nJMrKHo.
[30]Jonathan
Pearlman, Australian PM rejects Pacific
islands plea for climate action to ensure ‘survival,’ The Telegraph (Sept.
10, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/australia/11855946/Australian-PM-rejects-Pacific-islands-plea-for-climate-action-to-ensure-survival.html.
[31] Id.
[32] Cook Islands, supra note 21.
[33] Id.
[34] List of Representatives to the Paris Agreement (Apr.
22, 2016), http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/632121/list-of-representatives-to-high-level-signature-ceremony.pdf.
[35] Pearlman, supra note 30.
[36] Lenore Taylor,
Tony Abbott defends 2030 emissions target
criticized as ‘pathetically’ low, The
Guardian (Aug. 11, 2015, 1:44 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/aug/11/tony-abbott-defends-2030-emissions-target-criticised-as-pathetically-low.
[37] Pearlman, supra
note 30.
[38] Milman, supra note 8.
[39] Milman, supra note 8.
[40] See, e.g., The Trade and Climate Change Linkages, Int’l Ctr.
for Trade and Sustainable Dev. (May 30,
2011), http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2011/05/trade_
climate_change_brief_for_unfccc-secretariat-final.pdf.
[41] Id. at 1 (“[T]rade can directly and
indirectly affect climate change. For example, international transport, an essential
component in trade, is a direct contributor to greenhouse gas emissions . . .”).
[42] Henry Derwent,
What Has Climate to Fear from Trade?,
The E15 Initiative, Int’l Ctr. for Trade
and Sustainable Dev. 1 (Aug. 2015), http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Climate-Change-Derwent-FINAL.pdf.
[43] Markus W. Gehring, et al.,
Climate Change and Sustainable Energy
Measures in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs): An Overview, Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and
Sustainable Energy, Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable
Dev. 12, Issue Paper No. 3, (Aug.
2013), http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2013/08/climate-change-and-sustainable-energy-measures-in-regional-trade-agreements-rtas.pdfhttp://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2013/08/climate-change-and-sustainable-energy-measures-in-regional-trade-agreements-rtas.pdf.
[44] Id. at 5 (“New
climate regulations . . . may directly contradict key principles of WTO law,
which prohibit arbitrary, unjustifiable or disguised restrictions on
international trade . . .”).
[45] Robert Read, Trade, Economic Vulnerability, Resilience
and the Implications of Climate Change in Small Island and Littoral Developing
Economies, Programme
on Competitiveness and Sustainable Dev., Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable
Dev. 23, Issue
Paper No. 12, (June 2010), http://www.ictsd.org/downloads
/2010/07/trade-economic-vulnerability-resilience-and-the-implications-of-climate-change-in-sildes.pdf.
[47] Rafael
Leal-Arcas, Working
Together: How To Make Trade Contribute to Climate Action, Global Platform
on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy, Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev. 1 (Nov. 2013),
http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2013/11/working-together-how-to-make-trade-contribute-to-climate-action1.pdf.
[48] Pacific Island Countries to Redouble Efforts
to Conclude the PACER Plus Negotiations in 2016, Off. of the Chief Trade Advisor, http://www.octapic.org/pacific-island-countries-to-redouble-efforts-to-conclude-the-pacer-plus-negotiations-in-2016/ (last visited
May 21, 2016).
[49] Fiji to Host 13th PACER Plus Inter-sessional
Meeting, Off. of the Chief Trade
Advisor, http://www.octapic.org/fiji-to-host-13th-pacer-plus-inter-sessional-meeting/ (last visited
May 21, 2016). Launched in 2009, thirteen negotiations, or “inter-sessional
meeting[s,]” were held thus far with the most recent in December 2015. The
agreement is set to conclude by June 2016. The final text must then be ratified
by the parties’ legislatures before entering into force by, ideally, 2017. Dr.
Edwini Kessie, the Chief Trade Adviser for the Pacific Island Countries,
discussed the agreement’s progress saying, “The negotiations are in a decisive
phase with a few issues left to be resolved by the Parties. At the forthcoming
inter-sessional meeting, the Parties will identify possible landing zones which
would enable them to bridge the gaps in their negotiating position.” Id.
[50] E-mail from
Edwini Kessie, Chief Trade Adviser, Office of the Chief Trade Advisor, to
author (November 17, 2015 13:53 CET) (on file with author).
[52] Development Assistance, Off. of the Chief Trade Advisor, http://www.octapic.org/development-assistance/ (last visited
May 21, 2016) (defining “development assistance” as “development or foreign
aid…[granted] to achieve economic growth and sustainable development.”).
[53] See id.
[54] Geoffrey J. Bannister & Kamau Thugge, IMF, International Trade and Poverty Alleviation,
38(4) Fin. & Dev. (Dec. 2001),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/12/banniste.htm#author. Of note, these economists go on to
refute this claim that trade reform reduces government revenue in developing
countries, and explain their belief trade reform will actually increase government revenues. See generally id.
[55] World Bank, Customs
and other import duties (% of tax revenue), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.IMPT.ZS
(last visited June 7, 2016).
[56] Civil societies, trade unions raise concerns
over PACER-Plus, Radio New Zealand
Int’l (May 6, 2015 8:06 AM), http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/programmes/datelinepacific/audio/201753167/civil-societies,-trade-unions-raise-concerns-over-pacer-plus.
[57] Id.
[58] No NGO contribution to PACER-Plus talks
‘concerning’, Radio New Zealand Int’l
(May 7, 2015), http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/273052/no-ngo-contribution-to-pacer-plus-talks-'concerning'.
[59] PACER Plus: Benefits for Pacific Island
Countries, Off. of the Chief Trade
Advisor http://www.octapic.org/pacer-plus-benefits-for-pacific-island-countries/ (last visited
May 21, 2016).
[60] PACER Plus, supra note 56.
[61] Non-State Actors have their say on PACER
Plus, Off. of the Chief Trade Advisor,
http://www.octapic.org/non-state-actors-have-their-say-on-pacer-plus/ (last visited
May 21, 2016).
[62] Id.
[63] Leal-Arcas, supra note 47, at 2, 6.
[67] Canada-Peru
Agreement on Environment Cooperation, Can.-Peru, art. 2(6), May 28, 2008, 2009
Can. T.S. 16. [hereinafter Canada-Peru Environment Agreement].
[69] Canada-Peru
Environment Agreement, supra note 67,
at art. 2(4).
[70] North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Can-Mex.-U.S., Sept. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1480.
[74] Id. at 10.
[75] Id.
[76] Id. at 10, iv.
[77] Id. at 11.
[78] Gehring et al., supra
note 43, at 12 (explaining that, “To accommodate such [health,
environment, and conservation of natural resources] policies, [] many RTAs
contain provisions that establish exceptions, or ‘windows,’ in trade policy.
Such exceptions may be particularly relevant for adaptation, mitigation and
financing measures to respond to climate change in developing countries”).
[79] Id.
[80] Id. at 13-14.
[81] Id.
[82] Canada-Peru
Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Peru, art. 1701(2), May 29, 2008, 2009 Can. T.S. No.
15 Vol. II.
[83] E.U.-Colombia-Peru
Free Trade Agreement, Colom.-E.U.-Peru, art. 275(5), May 31, 2013, 2012
E.U. 735.
[84] Id. art. 270(1).
[85] Id. art. 275(1).
[87] Id. at 8.
[88] Id. at 9.
[91] Keith Wilson, Report on the 2010 Public Forum, Session 18:
Regionalism’s role in integrating the Pacific into the global trading system,
World Trade Org. (Sept. 16, 2010),
https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum10_e/session18_summ_e.doc.
[93]
Dejo Olowu, Environmental Governance
Challenges in Kiribati: An Agenda for Legal and Policy Responses, 3 L. Env’t. & Dev. J. 259, 268 (2007).
[94] NGOs, media locked out of PACER-Plus talks,
Radio New Zealand Int'l (May 6, 2015,
7:35 AM),
http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/272923/ngos,-media-locked-out-of-pacer-plus-talks.
[95] Civil societies, supra note 56.
[96] Non-State Actors, supra note 61.
[97] Summary of The Palgrave
Handbook of International Labour Migration (Marion Panizzon et al. eds., Palgrave Macmillian 2015), http://www.wti.org/research/publications/781/the-palgrave-handbook-of-international-labour-migration/ (last visited
June 4, 2016).
[98] Milman, supra note 8.
[99] Id.
[100] Vanuatu’s New PM creates Climate Change
ministry, Pacific Climate Change
Portal (May 21, 2013, 6:52 PM), http://www.pacificclimatechange.net/news/vanuatu’s-new-pm-creates-climate-change-ministry.
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