On June 23, British voters decided that the United Kingdom would leave the European Union. Over the summer, the results of the referendum led to a change in government. Now that Theresa May has taken over as Prime Minister, time has come for her to negotiate the best possible split with the European Union.
One of the most important
issues that will be discussed during the negotiations is immigration. Indeed, more than half of the voters who chose “leave” did so
because they believe that immigration originating from the EU is a threat.
Unfortunately for “leave” supporters, several elements place the UK at somewhat
of a disadvantage to negotiate full control over UK borders while retaining a
very desirable free market.
The issue of immigration is
intrinsically linked to that of free trade: the UK wants to significantly reduce
the free movement of people into the UK, and many are under the impression that
it can achieve this goal while also maintaining tariff-free access to the
European Union. David Davis, Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union,
expressed this view and stated his conviction that “once the European nations realize that we are not going to budge on control
of our borders, they will want to talk, in their own interest.”
Unfortunately for the UK, the
EU paints quite a different picture: Angela Merkel has made it clear that the UK will
not be able to cherry-pick only the pieces of the EU that it wants to retain. Martin Schulz, president of the European Parliament, agreed
with her when he stated: “there is no
intention to ensure that the UK receives a bad deal, but it is clear that there
can be no better deal with the EU than EU membership. The EU moreover must look
out for its members’ interests and uphold its founding principles. The single
market, for example, entails four freedoms (capital, goods, services, persons)
and not three, or three and a half.”
The UK’s
aspirations are thus likely to collide with several important EU interests,
which will make the task of UK negotiators all the more difficult. In a talk given at Georgetown “University Law Center on Europe After
Brexit,” the Ambassadors to the US from France, Germany, the Slovak Republic,
and the European Union made it clear, once again, that the UK could not obtain
a better deal now than the one it had in the Union. That is, in part, because the EU needs to deter future exits. Because nationalist
parties in other Member States will closely watch the deal that is eventually
agreed upon, the EU may have to walk away even from terms of a deal with the UK
that are economically attractive to the EU.
Moreover, some of the UK’s
demands are simply unrealistic. Millions of UK
citizens still live and work in EU member states. As a result, the UK retains a non-negligible interest in keeping barriers to the free movement of people minimal for its own
citizens. Boris Johnson, the new foreign secretary, promised that “British
people will still be able to go and work in the EU; to live; to travel; to
study; to buy homes and to settle down.” Unfortunately, this objective is unrealistic considering the UK’s
competing interest in keeping its own borders relatively closed-off to
immigration from the EU: Johnson is unlikely to be able to fulfill his promise without offering reciprocal rights to citizens of other EU Member States.
Furthermore, Davis’s claim
that the EU will want to reach an agreement in its own interest is perhaps
true, but is even more accurate concerning the UK. Indeed, the UK seems to
actually have more to lose in the case of a “no deal” scenario: while it exports about 45% of its total exports to the EU, exports to the
UK are only about 10% of total EU exports. Therefore, the UK is not in a position
of force and it will also be in its own self-interest to make concessions.
Finally, it is worth remembering
that the entire “leave” process is playing against British interests. To start the “Brexit” process, the UK
must first invoke Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union
(TEU). A decision of the British High Court held that May cannot
invoke Article 50 unless the British Parliament authorizes her to do so by a
majority vote. This is a first internal hurdle that May will have to overcome.
However, once
the UK does invoke Article 50, the country will have only two years to
negotiate its future relationship with the EU: the currently existing
relationship will automatically expire when a new agreement is reached, or when
the two-year negotiation period comes to an end.
For reasons
highlighted above, the negotiations are likely to draw out, and reaching a
compromise will be especially difficult considering the animosity some European
leaders have displayed towards the British decision. If, however, an agreement
is reached, it will still need to gain approval from at least a qualified majority of 72%
of the Member States, representing at least 65% of the population of the
European Union.
In fact, much
more likely is that all 27 national
parliaments will need to give approval. Indeed, if the proposed agreement is
considered to be of “mixed competence,” that is to say an agreement that
covers not just trade, but also foreign and security policy, the parliaments of
all 27 Member States will have to ratify the agreement before it can come into
effect.
As Philip Hammond, Chancellor of the Exchequer, noted, the
shortest time in which all 27 national parliaments ratified an agreement in any
former EU treaty is almost four years after the negotiations closed. As
such, and with the two-year clock ticking, May and her negotiators will be
facing an exceedingly difficult task once the negotiations begin: it may be
time for the UK to reevaluate its objectives.
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